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In Defence of Factions
Torun Dewan1 Francesco Squintani2
August 2015
We model faction formation in a world where party politicians’ objective is
the development of an informed program of governance. Politicians’ prefer-
ences reflect their own views and their information that, when aggregated via
intra-party deliberations, influences the party manifesto. By joining a faction
a politician increases the influence of its leader on the manifesto, but foregoes
his individual bargaining power. For broad model specifications we find that
a faction formation process allows power to be transferred to moderate politi-
cians. This facilitates information sharing, so increasing the capacity of the
party to attain its objective. These positive welfare effects may hold even when
factionalism restricts intra-party dialogue, and hold a fortiori when informa-
tion is freely exchanged across factions. We conclude that the existence of
ideological factions may benefit a party: it provides a means to tie uninformed
or extremist politicians to more moderate and informed faction leaders.
1London School of Economics and Political Science. email: t.dewan@lse.ac.uk
2Warwick University. email: F.Squintani@Warwick.ac.uk
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2INTRODUCTION
Analysis of political parties often makes use of the “unitary actor” assumption: the party is a
single player with a common and known objective. While, arguably, this assumption is useful
when considering certain party roles, such as bargaining over government formation, it is less
so when considering others. In many democracies, for example, parties have a rich tradition
of manifesto writing. In the Westminster system, which tends to produce single party majori-
ties, a manifesto establishes a direct mandate for governance linking pre-election promises to
policies implemented post-election. Where coalition governance is the norm, there is a close
link between policies proposed in the manifesto and final outcomes (Back et al., 2011). Indeed
it has been argued (Budge (1987), p.15), that manifestos “form genuine statements of pref-
erence rather than mere bargaining counters in negotiations.” Manifesto commitments are
enforced, albeit imperfectly, via party discipline which itself relates to institutional features
(such as the confidence procedure and party whips).
The extant literature suggests two factors that are important in determining a party’s pro-
gram. The first are its internal factions. The second is inherent uncertainty as to which
proposals allow the party to achieve its objectives. Budge et al. (2011) analyze party mani-
festos in twenty democracies in the post war period and find that “parties are ideologically
based and pursue their own policies, that they are internally factionalized and operating un-
der high levels of uncertainty.” In order to understand the policies proposed by a party we
therefore need to account for the balance of power between its factions and the mechanisms
deployed to reduce uncertainty in manifesto writing. Here, we develop a model in which the
manifesto is the outcome of bargaining between factions and where politicians preferences
over manifesto commitments are formed through intra-party deliberations.
The critical and novel feature of our model is that stable party factions emerge endogenously,
due to strategic choices made by politicians who consider the effect of joining one faction
(or another) or of remaining unaligned. It is logical that, if party factions influence policy,
then politicians will anticipate this effect when joining. Of course politicians join factions for
many reasons, amongst them the prospect of material reward. While such motives have been
studied formally (see Persico et al. (2011)), to our knowledge there is no model of factions
forming between politicians whose motives are, at least in part, ideological and who care
about the policies proposed in the party manifesto. Without a model it is hard to evaluate
the tradeoffs faced by such politicians when joining a faction and, moreover, the normative
consequences of factionalism.
Our normative approach to the impact of factions, from the perspective of intra-party deliber-
ation, is warranted. Theoretical argument and careful empirical evidence supports the view
3that intra-party debate can benefit a party. The argument goes back to Burke (1851) who,
in his essay “Of Parties in General,” defined a party as “a body of men united for promot-
ing by their joint endeavors the national interest.” His view was that the combined wisdom
and judgement of politicians formed the basis of a clear mandate for governance and that
intra-party deliberation enhanced this prospect. Empirical evidence comes from Wantchekon
(2003) and Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013): the former distinguishes the impact of appeals
based on manifesto promises of public goods provision from those offering material favors
in exchange for votes; the latter shows that pooling information via communication between
politicians and experts leads to more informed and effective party programmes.
From this perspective, factionalism might be seen as detrimental. White and Ypi (2011)
refer back to Burke in distinguishing a party that justifies its programme in the “name of
the whole” from a faction that “exhibits no concern to justify its program to the community
in toto.” Indeed, and although factions are seen as a “fact of life within parties” there is
a common perception that they, nevertheless, exacerbate non-cooperative behaviour and so
are antithetical to achievement of common goals. Boucek (2009) provides a review of the
field and notes that negative perceptions of factionalism originated with Hume (1877: Essay
VIII) and are still predominant. She, however, offers a different perspective, conjecturing
that “by facilitating the aggregate capacity of parties while preserving subgroup identities, a
factional structure may be instrumental in promoting intra-party cooperation and in building
integrated parties.” An example is provided by McAllister (1991) whose in-depth study of the
Australian Labour Party concludes that “modern factions are open, policy-oriented groups
whose activities are generally seen as accommodative rather than disruptive.”
We can abjudicate between these perspectives as the presumed negative consequences of fac-
tionalism are related to three facts relevant to our model. First, when joining a faction, a
politician relinquishes his independence and increases the power of a faction leader. Sec-
ond, in influencing the programme, such leaders consider only their own payoff and not what
is best for the party “in toto.” Third, factionalism may restrict intra-party deliberation and
hence communication of policy relevant information to decision-makers; so we compare an
“open” world where deliberations take place between politicians independently of their fac-
tional identity, to a “closed” one where communication between politicians belonging to dif-
ferent factions is stifled.
As a benchmark, motivated by the normative critiques of factionalism above, we analyze
a party in which power is shared equally between politicians of different viewpoints who
deliberate openly over outcomes. Our results challenge the negative perception of factions
and, indeed, are in line with Boucek’s claim that factions “facilitate the aggregate capacity
4of parties.” Here, party welfare depends, in part, upon the amount of policy-relevant infor-
mation pooled via intra-party deliberations, precisely the mechanism identified empirically
by Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013) amongst others. Surprisingly, we find that parties can
maximize the potential impact of such deliberations by allowing, rather than prohibiting,
faction formation. Moreover, when led by politicians who are moderate with respect to the
spectrum of opinions, factions are strictly welfare enhancing. These positive welfare effects
may hold even when factionalism restricts intra-party dialogue. And they hold a fortiori
when information is freely exchanged across factions.
The key intuition and novel insight that emerges from our analysis is that factions provide a
mechanism by which power can be transferred to better informed politicians. We provide an
organizational rationale for factions that we label “tying in the extremists”: factions tie politi-
cians with the most extreme views to more moderate faction leaders who are better placed to
take party decisions due to others’ willingness to communicate (truthfully) with them. Con-
versely we provide conditions under which factions are detrimental to party welfare: this can
only occur when their leaders hold extreme views relative to other members of the faction.
Our notion of tying in the extremists resonates with detailed empirical study of intra-party
politics. Notably, Muller-Rommel (1982) analyses the German Social Democrats between the
years 1969-80 during which, under party leader Willy Brandt, they embarked on a strategy
of “openness” toward informally organized groups amongst its leftist activist base (the so
called JUSOS). Muller-Rommel (1982) highlights (p.263) that the integration of these radical
groups into the party mainstream was achieved by increasing influence of existing organized
factions,3 thus he finds (p.266) that party factions were a “stabilising element in the struc-
tural development of the party.” His argument corresponds with our (more general) finding
that factions (can) improve the efficiency of parties by allowing for better exchange of policy
relevant information via intra-party deliberation.4 He concludes (p.263) that “well function-
ing internal factional communication structures are a necessary condition for successfully
enhancing the ability of informal groups to act. The efficiency of factional activity increases
with the frequency of communication between (if possible) many faction members.” Indeed
our theoretical model shows that efficiency is enhanced when communication is “open” be-
tween party factions.
3He describes the formation and development of the main intraparty groupings–to the left the Frankfurter Kreiss
(or Circle), on the center-left the Godesberger Kreiss, on the centre-right the Tubinger Kreiss, and to the right the
Kurt-Schumacher Kreiss. For each faction, Muller Rommel identifies the membership of the party’s Bundestag
fraktion (caucus), its internal factions, and their main programmatic goals. Of particular interest was the devel-
opment of a leftist faction, that became known as the Leverkusener Kreiss, following the 1969 election. It grew to
approximately one third, numbering between forty and sixty deputies, and played a pivotal role in the inclusion
of leftist groups and politicians.
4The information gathering exercises and informal internal communication structures of the different factions are
described in great detail. For example, we learn that the Leverkussen Circle met regularly with policy experts
and practitioners and that faction members held office on the 16th floor of the Bundestag and met regularly for
dinner, and always on Tuesdays and Thursdays, to deliberate over policy (p.153-154).
51. INTRA-PARTY BARGAINING AND DELIBERATION
Before providing an overview of our main findings and more detailed analysis, we pause in
order to justify the key assumptions that underpin our model. The first and central aspect
of our model is that manifesto outcomes reflect weighted intra-party bargaining between
factions. The second is that intra-party deliberations are used to alleviate the uncertainty
faced by a party when drafting their policy proposals.
1.1. Intra-party bargaining. We view a faction as a resource that allows its leader influ-
ence over policy. Our view thus accords with that of Laswell (1931) whose definition in the
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences states: “the term faction is commonly used to designate any
constituent group of a larger unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or
policies.”
We study the influence of ideological party factions on its manifesto and so set aside the view
that factions form to pursue particular material interests (as noted already, the endogenous
formation of such “factions of interest” has already been studied). We view the manifesto as
an outcome of bargaining between party faction leaders. More specifically, in our model the
weight given to a faction leader’s views is increasing in the size of his faction. Correspond-
ingly, when joining a faction, a politician increases the influence of its leader on final policy.
We discuss the general claim and the specific assumption in turn, and with reference to the
empirical literature on political parties.
The existence of ideological factions has been noted in several empirical studies. Rose (1964)
identified the organizing principle of a faction’s ideology– shared values around which faction
members ultimately cohere and coordinate activity. Analyzing over 100 parties on several
dimensions, Janda (1980) found that the most common basis of factionalism was ideological
and that factions typically also had distinct leaders. Moreover, recent text analysis using
state of the art estimation and measurement techniques on party documents and speeches
provides strong evidence of ideological intra-party groupings (see Laver and Giannetti (2004),
Konig (2006), and Bernauer and Brauninger (2008) amongst others).5
Our claim that the manifesto reflects the outcomes of bargaining between factions is of course
a generalisation. As stated by Lo et al. (2014): “there are few common procedures that govern
how parties arrive at the final draft. At one extreme, a small committee composed of the party
leadership may write the manifesto. At the other extreme, a party conference may discuss
various proposals and vote on an issue-by-issue basis on amendments.” Put otherwise, there
are a large number of extensive form games that could be analyzed to represent the specific
5A common distinction is made between ideological factions of “principle” and factions of “interest” (see Bettcher
(2005). Things may not be so clear cut. Boucek (2012) finds that faction motivations are themselves endogenous
to national and party level institutions.
6protocols adopted by different parties. While our reduced-form approach can be justified due
to the feasibility constraint imposed by analyzing such a broad class of games, a stronger
defence is built on empirical grounds: our approach is consistent with broad findings in the
empirical literature showing that a party manifesto (or changes to it over time) reflect the
weights of different party factions.
The earliest claims that party manifestos could be related to the bargaining power of factions
can be traced back to Harmel et al. (1995). They understood manifesto (as well as other
party) change as due to alternation in a party’s “dominant faction.”6 For example, they argue
that replacement of the “left” with the “new socialist right” as the party’s dominant faction
led to the adoption of the Bad Godesberg programme by the German Social Democratic Party
in 1958. Budge et al. (2011) analyze the time series of party positions measured by manifesto
documents and find that “factional struggles power the policy alternation pattern observed
on the left-right continuum.” Similarly, Lo et al. (2014) view a manifesto as a resolution
mechanism for two factions (or, equivalently, two groups of voters), differentiated according
to their ideology and competing for control.
Our more specific claim, that outcomes correspond to weighted bargaining, can also be jus-
tified. As noted by Levy (2004), even “the mechanisms by which Western European parties
reach internal compromise in their manifestos mimic some form of a weighted average of
the ideal policies of their factions; the parties delegates vote on the policy principals in an
annual conference whereas the balance of power between factions, that is, the proportion
of votes that each faction receives, is translated into policy recommendations. These policy
recommendations are then incorporated into the party’s election manifesto.”7 Indeed, the
statistical evidence of Lo et al. (2014) is consistent with the conjecture that, on average, the
manifesto content is a weighting of the ideological differences between different factions.
A recent and specific case study is by Ceron (2012) who provides strong evidence in support
of the assumption that “factions negotiate over party positions according to the bargaining
power of each subgroup.” He uses data from party congresses in Italy to measure faction
preferences and size and relates this to policy positions of Italian parties. His empirical
finding is that “party position will be closely related to the weighted mean of the factions’
positions. Factions then affect the party proportionally to their strength.” These findings are
perhaps surprising since on many dimensions, e.g. candidate selection, Italian parties are
quite centralised (see Galasso and Nannicini (2011)). Importantly for our purposes, Ceron
6While the authors do not provide an exact account of their coding, the discussion makes clear that changes in a
party’s dominant faction reflects the relative size of factions as well as to their leaders.
7In so far as such formal mechanisms are binding. Michels (1915/1958) classic analysis of the German Socialist
Party, showed that although policymaking was governed by constitutional procedures these were ignored by the
party oligarchy. McKenzie (1955) revealed few differences in practice between procedures adopted by the British
Labour and Conservative parties despite the constitutional status of the party conference in the latter.
7finds that allowing for the identity of the median (politician or faction) in the party does not
improve the fit of his statistical model when accounting for the bargaining weights of the
party factions. This finding corresponds with our predictions (proposition 4) below.
Of course there are mitigating factors. For example, Ceron shows that, in Italy, the rela-
tionship between the proportional strength of factions and policy position is stronger when
leaders are elected by party committee. This suggests that our assumptions are weaker when
leaders have a degree of autonomy from the parliamentary party. Such autonomy might arise
when a leader’s power stems from her direct relationship with voters or extra-parliamentary
groups. Nevertheless, even in such less likely cases, the qualitative evidence suggests that,
at times, our weighted bargaining assumption may hold. Beer (1965), for example, studies
the British Labour Party in the 1950’s and 60’s. It was part of a two-party system whereby its
manifesto provided a direct mandate for governance. Under its constitution, the party’s Na-
tional Executive Committee in charge of writing the manifesto was to implement the wishes
of the party conference. Beer shows (chapter 8) that the party manifesto was neither con-
trolled by a centralised leadership or a majority in party conference. Instead, he argues that
the party was divided “vertically between two sets of followers and leaders” (p.231). Each
faction “had an ideology and each sought to commit Labour to its ideological position.” While
the revisionists behind Hugh Gaitskell had the “balance of advantage in program-making”
they were unable always to impose their views on the fundamentalist faction lead by Ernest
Bevan. The latter could count on a “solid core of about a quarter” of the parliamentary party
which included Bevan’s “able lieutenants,” key members of the National Executive Council
who directly influenced the manifesto.8
1.2. Intra-party deliberations. We allow our politicians a rich set of motivations: they
have (idiosyncratic) ideological concerns but also share a common desire that the party de-
velop an informed program of governance. As we will describe in more detail in the following
section, this statement (and so our model) is consistent with different interpretations. A lead-
ing interpretation is that politicians desire a program that is informed as to the wishes of the
party’s target voters. A different interpretation draws upon Burke’s view of programmatic
political parties cited earlier. According to this view the party program reflects politicians’
views about the national interest. Whichever interpretation of politicians motives we adopt,
8The British Labour Party provides several episodes consistent with our claim that factions tie extremists to
more moderate and better informed leaders. One such example follows its defeat to the Conservatives in the
1987 general election. The party’s Policy Review involved a series of working groups each run by a Shadow
Minister from the Shadow Cabinet (elected by MPs and broadly representative of the party’s different ideological
factions). A key division was that between Modernisers and Traditionalists, the former providing the origins of
what was to become New Labour. Although the party was centralised under its centre-right leader Neil Kinnock
and his Private Office, on key policy areas it was important to keep the left on board. A key element of reform was
the policy review for Employment, Training, and Labour Law drafted by Michael Meacher, Shadow Secretary for
Employment, and a traditionalist who could deliver the support of the left. (Source, private conversation with
David Soskice, January 2015).
8there is inherent uncertainty as to which policies should be pursued toward such aims. Thus,
insofar as a politician (or perhaps the party leader) wishes to appeal to voters (or to the
national interest) she alone does not know which policies best serve that purpose.
This uncertainty faced by parties in the manifesto writing process has been the subject of
several recent empirical papers. These relate the time series of party manifesto observa-
tions (analyzed on the left-right dimension) to inductive and myopic decision rules that a
vote-maximizing party may adopt from one election to another: Somer-Topcu (2009) explores
policy adjustments as a response to electoral losses in the previous election; while Adams and
Somer-Topcu (2009) consider policy change in a current election as related to moves made by
other parties in previous ones.9
While commonly observed and relatively easy to measure factors, such as previous policies
and election results, are easily incorporated in our model (a common prior will suffice), our
focus instead is on intra-party deliberations that form part of the manifesto writing process.
That intra-party deliberations take place is self-evident: at any party gathering, politicians
will exchange views. Indeed, deliberation is a main mechanism deployed by parties to reduce
uncertainty and is widely used by different parties. Consider, for example, the two main
British political parties who, as we write, are finalising their manifestos for the upcoming
2015 election. Central to the manifesto preparations of the Labour Party is its Policy Review
led by key members of the party’s Shadow Cabinet, each with a different policy brief. It is, as
described in the documentation of the party, “a comprehensive process of discussion looking
at every aspect of Labour policy in order to support the development of our manifesto for
2015.” Deliberations are also central to the Conservative manifesto writing process via the
Policy Forum that produces discussion briefs on manifesto issues-for example, most recently,
housing and planning - that are then submitted to the party’s Central Office.
The existence of such deliberations does not, of course, ensure their relevance to the mani-
festo writing process. Such deliberative processes might be adopted for other purposes. For
example they can provide coordination around a leader’s views.10 However, as noted by Landa
and Meirowitz (2009),“ if political debate is to serve a purpose beyond allowing politicians to
simply coordinate on a particular policy choice—if the purpose is to meaningfully change the
preferences of politicians over outcomes—then the information held by participants about
policy choices cannot be common knowledge: some information must be private.” Conse-
quently, we start from the premise that, although no politician is perfectly informed about
the wishes of the party’s target voters, or the best policies to pursue from a national interest
perspective, each has some private information that is relevant to choices a party makes.
9More generally, Callander (2011) has analyzed a dynamic theoretical model in which the search for “good poli-
cies” is related to observed policy outcomes that correspond to a Brownian motion.
10See Dewan and Myatt (2007), for a formal analysis.
9Such information may be obtained from constituency surgeries, interactions with research
staff, or other sources. It can be exchanged in informal discussions or in formal consultation
and intra-party deliberations such as those mentioned above. And it can affect the views of
those (faction leaders) who determine the party policy.
As customary in the formal-theoretic literature, we identify debate with verbal (cheap talk)
communication between privately-informed participants seeking to arrive at a collective choice.11
Specifically, we assume that each politician observes a private but imperfect signal. Using the
multi-player communication model by Galeotti et al. (2013), we study the strategic commu-
nication of such information to party decision-makers who, in our model, are faction leaders.
This setup proves useful when analyzing manifestos as a collection of policy decisions to be
made, where politicians have private information that is relevant to each of these decisions,
and where players preferences are affected by communication between them. Indeed as the
model can be used to describe any directed network of communication, it covers the types
of discussions that politicians might have in the deliberative forums mentioned above. Our
analysis of intraparty deliberation provides a framework for exploring the normative con-
sequences of factionalism. As stated by Landa and Meirowitz: “Unless we understand the
conditions under which the incentives in deliberative environments encourage agents to be
sincere or fully revealing, as opposed to insincere or withholding information, we cannot hope
to offer a coherent (stable) normative argument for institutional design.”
2. OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE RELATED LITERATURE
We contribute to a literature on endogenous parties stimulated by Krehbiel (1993), who
raised the possibility that effects attributed to party organization may be due to similar-
ity of preferences, that influenced a large body of work: Patty (2008) formalizes the notion
of a “cartel party” and shows the effect of the size of the majority on its ability to discipline
its members; Eguia (2011a,b) looks at the role of parties in enabling blocs of politicians to
achieve mutually beneficial outcomes that could not be obtained were each legislator to act
in isolation. Morelli (2004) analyzes the effect of the electoral system on party formation;
whereas Snyder and Ting (2002) explore the effect of party labels. Levy (2004) explores
party formation using the citizen-candidate model and shows that parties are “effective”–
they influence outcomes independently–only when the policy space is multidimensional. In
our paper, a party is given by the set of players (politicians) and its internal factions form
endogenously. These partitions are effective, in a sense similar to Levy, when parties are
sufficiently heterogenous.
11See Minozzi et al. (2013) for a dissenting voice arguing that such a formulation of political debate and the
deliberative process omits key, philosophical reasons for deliberation, such as a desire on the part of participants
to publicly articulate reasons for their desired outcomes.
10
We share a focus on the intra-party determinants of the party platform with Caillaud and
Tirole (2002, 1999) who also analyze the allocation of control rights on the quality of the
party platform. In their model the platform has an ideological and a valence component (a
left policy, for example, can be of high or low quality). Ideological dissonance between the
party leadership and its rank and file provides incentives for the former to invest in the
quality of the platform design. The authors contrast platform design in an authoritarian
party (where control is exercised by the leadership) and a democratic one run by the rank
and file. Castanheira et al. (2010) analyze platform design in a similar set up with two party
competition that allows them to explore rent-seeking behavior given the equilibrium degree
of intra-party competition.
In our model, quality depends upon the pooling of policy relevant information via intra-party
deliberation rather than on investments made by party leaders. Our theoretical investi-
gation into strategic aspects of intra-party deliberation follows Galeotti et al. (2013) whose
framework for the study of multi-player communication provides tractability and substan-
tive new political insights as witnessed by a host of recent papers: Patty and Penn (2014)
study information transmission in small networks of decision makers; Patty (2013) deter-
mines the optimal exclusion and inclusion policies to maximize information sharing among
cabinet members; Gailmard and Patty (2009) study transparency and optimal delegation
by a principal to informed agents; Dewan et al. (2015) investigate the optimal assignment
of decision-making power in the executive of a parliamentary democracy; and Penn (2015)
studies the formation of stable aggregations of different units within an association.
While these papers build on the same methodology, each studies distinct political problems.
At the purely theoretical level, the closest papers to ours are the latter two. Nevertheless,
there are significant differences making our analysis both novel and challenging. Specifically,
unlike Penn (2015) who holds the allocation of authority as exogenous, here the allocation is
endogenously transferred to the leaders of factions that form in equilibrium. And unlike De-
wan et al. (2015), who study the optimal allocation of authority within a group of politicians,
we solve the significantly more complex problem of determining the equilibrium outcome of
voluntary transfer of authority.
We believe our model is the first that explores the endogenous formation of ideological fac-
tions of “principle”. However, a recent paper by Persico et al. (2011) looks at the formation of
factions of “interest”. In their model factional allegiance allows politicians to advance their
careers and deliver pork to their constituents. A faction is a “team of politicians who are
mutually dependent on each other for career advancement.” Despite this critical difference,
the two models have a common component in that both build on an intuitive assumption that
factions become stronger– they have more bargaining power–the larger they are; in their
11
model a candidate’s ability to obtain pork for his district depends upon the size and composi-
tion of the faction to which he belongs; in ours, a politician anticipates that joining a faction
strengthens the position of its leader and influence on policy.
3. MODEL
In this section we describe our model of endogenous faction formation and political debate
within the party. We define a factional structure as a pair consisting of a partition of the
party into factions, together with a leader for each faction. The influence of a faction leader
on the party manifesto increases in the size of his faction. Intra party debate takes place
after the faction building stage, before the party manifesto is produced, and so is anticipated
by politicians. We study factional structures that satisfy a specific stability/equilibrium re-
quirement, motivated by the idea that factional structures should not be upset by unilateral
deviations. The factional structure is stable if there is an equilibrium (within a class with
desirable properties to be specified) in which each politician chooses to remain in his faction.
Importantly, our model’s restrictions are minimal. We do not commit to any specific game
form that describes which politicians become faction leaders and how factions form. Thus,
our results may be applied to political environments characterized by different mechanisms.
3.1. Party Factions and the Manifesto. We let I = {1, ..., I} be the set of prominent,
ideologically differentiated politicians in a party. A factional structure within I is defined as
a partition C = {F1, ..., FN} of I, together with a function L assigning a leader l ∈ F for each
faction F. We let L−1(l) ≡ F(l) denote the faction of leader l.
To determine the stability of each factional structure (C,L) we introduce the following polit-
ical game. Initially, the party is factionalized according to the structure (C,L). In the first
stage of the game, each player i chooses whether to stay in his own faction, move to a dif-
ferent faction, or act independently. When joining a faction F led by leader l, a politician i
increases the influence of l in the party, measured by the influence weight pil ∈ (0, 1), and we
normalize the sum of the influence weights across leaders to one. For simplicity, the impli-
cations of a leader l’s influence on the party manifesto are summarized by a single strategic
variable yˆl that lies on the left-right spectrum R. We assume that only faction leaders exert
any influence on the party manifesto and that if a faction leader moves to a different faction
he transfers his influence to the leader of that faction. We denote the factional structure that
arises after this first stage of the game as (C′,L′), to distinguish it from the initial structure
(C,L).
Each politician i would like that all leaders’ choices yˆl to be as close as possible to his ideal
point on R. The ideal point is parameterized as θ + bi, where θ is an unknown state of the
12
world, uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The state θ represents the common, but uncertain com-
ponent of the preferences of politicians in I. Each one of them would like the ‘best decisions’
to be made as far as θ is concerned. We are agnostic about the precise definition of “best” as
different parties may have different objectives. Interpretations include best from the voters’
perceived perspective, so that politicians share a common aim of election, or best in the sense
of policies that are in voters’ interest. The relevant point is that, whatever politicians’ objec-
tives, they are uncertain as to which policies best serve their intentions. As we shall see, this
implies that it is beneficial to all politicians in I that as much information as possible on θ
is conveyed to faction leaders through political debate. For each individual politician i, the
individual bias bi represents the extent and direction of i’s bliss point deviation from θ. This
may reflect i’s own personal views and/or those of i’s constituents.
The focus of our model is the impact of factions on political debate within parties. In order to
study intra-party communication, we adopt the following functional form for each politician
i’s terminal payoff:





yˆL′(F ) − θ − bi
)2
,
where we set piL′(F ) = |F |/I, the fraction of politicians in I that belong to F, and we also define
ui(L′(F ), yˆL′(F ), θ) = −
(
yˆL′(F ) − θ − bi
)2, for future reference. As shown in Galeotti et al.
(2013), this utility specification yields a simple and tractable equilibrium solution, within
the communication game that we describe below.
3.2. Intra-party Debate. We stipulate that each politician i has some private information
on θ. This, as already noted, is a necessary feature of a model of political debate. Here,
each politician’s information may come from his own research or information gleaned from
interest groups, think tanks, private experts and other interested parties. We represent i’s
private information as a signal si that follows a simple statistical law: conditional on the
state θ, si takes the value equal to one with probability θ and to zero with probability 1− θ.
Before faction leaders exert their influence on the manifesto, politicians can convey their
views and information to them. Communication takes a very simple form. Each politician i
may send (possibly differentiated) message mˆij ∈ {0, 1} to any other politician j. A pure com-
munication strategy of player i is a function mij of si. Each communication strategy mij from
i to j may either be truthful, in that a politician reveals his signal to j so that mij(si) = si
for si ∈ {0, 1}, or not: in the latter case, mij(si) does not depend on si. For any communica-
tion strategy profile m, we let each politician j’s information dj(m) be the number of binary
signals known by player j after communication takes place, and note that dj(m) equals the
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number of players i whose strategy mij is truthful plus one. Our model allows for communi-
cation with multiple politicians, but we restrict to simultaneous messaging.12
As noted in our introduction, the existence of factions may exacerbate noncooperative forms of
intra-party behaviour. We study the (possibly) negative consequences of factions in prohibit-
ing intra-party communication, analyzing communication under two different social norms.
Under open communication, all politicians can communicate to any other politician. Com-
munication is closed if politicians can communicate only within their faction–i.e. players are
restricted to sending at most one truthful message.
After debate takes place, by sequential rationality, each leader l makes choice yˆl to maximize
his expected utility E[ul(yˆ, θ, pi)|sl, mˆ−l,l], where the expectation is taken with respect to θ,
and the pair (sl, mˆ−l,l) represents l’s information (specifically, l’s signal and the messages
received by other politicians). We denote the associated policy strategy as yl : {0, 1}I → <.
3.3. Equilibrium Concept and Selection. Our solution concept is pure-strategy Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium. There may be multiple equilibria (m,y) in the communication games
taking place after factions are established. For example, the strategy profile where no player
is truthful and no information is aggregated in the party is always an equilibrium. Politi-
cians’ welfare, however, increases when information is aggregated: faction leaders are better
informed, so the quality of the party programme is enhanced. Correspondingly we adopt the
standard equilibrium selection criterion: in the political game, we select equilibria (C′,L′;m,y)
that maximize each politician’s welfare and information aggregation on the equilibrium path.
Specifically, we focus on equilibria (C′,L′;m,y) such that dl(m) is as large as possible, for all
faction leaders l. As we shall see, our simple information and signal structure means that,
along the equilibrium path, beliefs are straightforward to define using Bayes’ Rule.
In order to construct out-of equilibrium beliefs we need to consider deviations in the stage
in which players choose their factional allegiance. If a player j deviates from the initial fac-
tional structures (C,L) –by choosing to join a faction different from his initial one, or by acting
independently and retaining power over yj– then we restrict beliefs at any subsequent infor-
mation set as follows. We posit that beliefs are consistent with play of the non-informative
strategy mij for all players i 6= j, so that dj(m) = 1; whereas dl(m) is still as large as possible,
for all leaders l ∈ L′. An interpretation of this restriction is that any player j who deviates
from his initial factional allocation is punished by “ostracism” —i.e., nobody in the party is
willing to talk to him anymore, whereas faction leaders are still optimally informed within
the party.13
12We restrict to multi-player simultaneous cheap talk as multi-player multi-round cheap talk is very involved.
For an analysis of a dynamic setting and a single informed sender, see Ivanov (2013).
13Cutting down all communication to a politician who deviates from his initial factional allocation provides strong
incentives against deviation. Note, however, the existence of a more potent punishment for j’s deviation: he would
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Within the equilibrium class defined above, we select the equilibria (C′,L′;m,y) that maxi-
mize welfare within the party. Our notion of welfare is ex-ante utilitarian. We let Ui (j,m, yj) =
−E[(yj (sj , mˆ−j,j)−θ−bi)2] be the equilibrium utility of politician i from the influence of politi-
cian j over the party programme in equilibrium (C′,L′;m,y). So, the Utilitarian party welfare
W (m,y; C′,L′) is the sum of the utilities Ui (m,y; C′,L′) =
∑
F∈C′ piL′(F )Ui
(L′(F ),m, yL′(F ))
across the politicians i ∈ I. However, some of our results hold also if considering all Pareto
optimal equilibria, instead of only ex-ante Utilitarian optimal ones.
3.4. Our Faction Stability Criterion. We define a factional structure (C,L) stable, if the
game with initial structure (C,L) has an equilibrium (C′,L′;m,y) among those selected above,
in which each politician (including leaders) confirms allegiance to his initial faction, i.e., C′ =
C, and L′ = L. In line with the empirical literature that points to ideologically cohesive
groupings, as mentioned earlier, we restrict to ideologically connected factions: If politicians
i and j belong to faction F , then so does any politician k whose bias bk is between bi and bj .
Our core results compare these party structures with those that would exist if factions did
not form. The benchmark of a non-factional party P = ({{i} : i ∈ I}, I) is defined as the
one in which factions are prohibited and so each politician i decides on yi but all politicians
can communicate freely with each other. In the statement of our results we make use of the
fact that P could arise (possibly) as a stable factional structure, or it could be imposed were
factionalism to be prohibited.14
Our model restrictions are minimal and so its results may be applied to political environ-
ments characterized by different mechanisms determining how factions form and who leads
them. For example, a simple game is one in which there are no factions at the beginning of
the game, and politicians first choose whether to try and form a faction becoming potential
leaders; then the political game described above is played. Another possibility is to presume
that the party is already factionalized at the beginning of the game, that different faction
members challenge each other for leadership, and that then faction members may choose to
change allegiance depending on the outcome of the power struggle for faction leadership.15
be worse off if all players consequently communicated noninformatively with all faction leaders. Although more
potent, we consider it unrealistic to impose a complete breakdown of intra-party communication and, happily,
our results do not require us to make this restriction.
14Our benchmark is purposively normative, motivated by critiques of factionalism mentioned earlier. An alter-
native approach is to consider a party that first elects a leader who determines the policy position. In ongoing
work (citation omitted) we show that majority rule can then lead to inefficiency relative to a weighted utilitarian
benchmark.
15Less obviously, our model also covers a game form in which politicians delegate authority to each other in
subsequent stages. In that game, a player endowed with authority from another politician may further transmit
this authority to a third politician. Potentially, a network of delegated authority arises in equilibrium with a
structure more complex than the partitional factional structures we consider here. Omitted results, available
upon request, show that all equilibrium networks are equivalent to a partitional structure.
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4. EQUILIBRIUM COMMUNICATION AND FACTION FORMATION
In any equilibrium of our game, a politician anticipates the effect of his faction allegiance on
final party policy. Consequently, he is willing to be in a faction only if he expects that the
leader will be more informed than he is in equilibrium. As customary, we solve our game
backwards and here we use results by Galeotti et al. (2013) to determine the equilibria of the
intra-party deliberation stage before then deriving the stable factional structures (C,L).
4.1. Equilibrium Communication. The solution of the communication game is described
as follows. Given communication equilibrium strategies m, a politician j’s choice is yj =
E [θ|sj , mˆ−j,j ] + bj .16 In words, the preferred choice of each politician j equals the expected
value of the common state θ given his equilibrium information, plus his ideological bias bj .
Further, in anticipation of the final decisions, the profile of communication strategies m is an
equilibrium if and only if, whenever a politician i is truthful to a politician j,
|bi − bj | ≤ 1
2 [dj(m) + 2]
.
The possibility for truthful communication from i to j is independent of whether i is truthful
or not to any other politician; and it becomes less likely with (i) an increase in the bias
difference |bi− bj | and (ii) an increase in the information held by j in equilibrium. Intuitively,
ideological differences can prohibit the effective aggregation of information.
On the basis of this finding, we can define the maximum possible information dj held by





= d,where the function nj : R+ → N is defined as nj(b) = |{i ∈ I : |bi − bl| ≤ b}|
—for any set A, the notation |A| denotes the cardinality of A. We note that, by construction,
the maximum information dj coincides with dj(P), the equilibrium information held by each
politician j in the non-factionalized party.
For any initial factional structure (C,L), the equilibrium information dj (C,L) of politician
j depends on whether j is a faction leader or not, and on whether communication is open
or closed. For each leader l ∈ L, under open communication, dl (C,L) = dl, the leader is
as informed as possible in equilibrium. Under closed communication, instead dl (C,L) =
min{dl, |F (l)|}: the leader is as informed as possible, compatible with the constraint that only
members of his own faction communicate with him.
The information dj (C,L) of any politician j, influences the expected utility accrued by any
player i anticipating the influence exerted by j on the manifesto. But player i’s expected
16Politician j may exert influence even if he is not a leader in L, as he may choose to withdraw allegiance to his
faction, in the first stage of the game, and act independently in the party.
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utility is also influenced by the ideological distance between player i and player j. Specifically,
the expected utility accrued by any player i for politician j’s influence is:
Ui (j, C,L) = − 1
6 (dj (C,L) + 2) − (bi − bj)
2 . (1)
The expected utility of player i decreases in the ideological difference with politician j and
increases in the equilibrium information dj (C,L) held by j.
4.2. Stable Factional Structures. We now turn to the novel aspects of our enquiry, ana-
lyzing a model of faction stability built on the notion of voluntaryism: each politician i freely
chooses his factional allegiance, anticipating the process of intra-party communication and
the final party program. In so doing he maximizes his own expected utility. Expression (1)
allows us to find a simple characterization of stable factional structures, which we report in
the following Lemma 1 (the proof is omitted as it is immediate). To simplify the exposition of
this result and subsequent ones, we henceforth restrict attention to equilibria of the commu-
nication game in which politicians babble to every politician j who is not a faction leader, so
that dj (C,L) = 1.17
Lemma 1. Every stable factional structure (C,L) is such that for any faction F and politicians




dL(F ) (C,L) + 2
) + (bi − bL(F ))2 ≤ 16 (dj (C,L) + 2) + (bi − bj)2 . (2)
The result is intuitive. The factional structure (C,L) is stable to unilateral deviations if each
politician i ∈ F prefers that his faction leader L(F ) has influence over the manifesto, rather
than maintaining his independence or throwing his weight behind a different faction leader.
By construction, this choice is checked under the stipulation that leaders are as informed as
possible, compatible with equilibrium of the intra-party communication game, whereas all
other politicians do not receive any information.18
As our model is one of cheap talk, we do not assume that a faction leader is informed by
all members of her faction. Indeed it may be that a politician will join a faction while being
unable to communicate truthfully with its leader.
17Non-truthful communication with politicians other than faction leaders can be sustained in equilibrium, since
decisions yˆj made by politicians j 6= i that do not lead a faction do not affect i’s payoff. Consequently, the
restriction that dj (C,L) = 1 is with no loss of generality.
18We surmise that Lemma 1 and all subsequent results hold also when changing the order of moves in the polit-
ical game, so that players first communicate and then form factions. In fact, the choice of politicians of whether
to confirm their allegiance to a faction leader or not in expectation that he will be informed through private com-
munication is equivalent to the choice of whether to confirm allegiance or not after private communication has
taken place, as politicians cannot observe the messages sent to the faction leaders. A difference in these games
is that the stable factional structure could no longer be enforced through “ostracism”.
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Lemma 2. Politician i does not communicate with his faction leader L(F ) when the ideologi-
cal difference between i and L(F ) is neither so small that i can always communicate with his




dL(F ) (C,L) + 2
] < ∣∣bi − bL(F )∣∣ ≤√ 118 − 16 [dL(F ) (C,L) + 2] . (3)
For there to exist a range of
∣∣bi − bL(F )∣∣ such that this condition can be satisfied, it must be that
the leader is sufficiently informed: dL(F ) (C,L) ≥ 3.
This result is intuitive. If the ideological difference between the politician and the faction
leader is small then he will communicate information truthfully to her. If, on the other hand,
it is too large, then he will not join her faction. For intermediate values, the politician is
willing to join the faction, as long as its leader is sufficiently informed. But at the same time,
he is unable to truthfully communicate with the leader, in equilibrium. Why? Although he is
happy to throw his weight behind the faction leader, the politician still wishes to influence her
views. But because he is not ideologically close enough to reveal his information truthfully, in
equilibrium, any such advise would be ignored.19 Realistically, then, some faction members
will be closer to their leader than others: they will be able to communicate information and
so affect the faction leaders views while other members will not.
5. PARTY WELFARE
Using equality (1) allows us to express party welfare as a simple function of the factional
structure (C,L):










dL(F ) (C,L) + 2
) + (bi − bL(F ))2
]
. (4)
The party values information, i.e. high dL(F ) (C,L), and moderation, i.e. bL(F ) close to the
party average
∑
i∈I bi/I with faction leaders L(F ). As implied by Proposition 1 of Dewan
et al. (2015), the optimal allocation of bargaining authority empowers a single leader who,
amongst the set of politicians, provides an optimal mix of moderation and informed policy.
Central to our analysis, however, is that party politicians cannot be coerced into granting all
power to a benevolent party dictator. Instead the organizational principle of faction forma-
tion is voluntary transfer of authority to faction leaders. This raises the possibility that a
factionalized party may provide a second-best alternative to one that is centralized under a
welfare-maximizing leader.
19Instead, if the leader L(F ) is not well informed (dL(F ) (C,L) < 3), then i joins her faction only if he is ideologi-
cally so close that he can also communicate to her truthfully, in equilibrium.
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In order to pursue this line of enquiry we require a benchmark for comparison. As noted in
our introductory remarks there are, we believe, three principal reasons for the negative con-
notations of factionalism: that party politicians relinquish their independence when joining
a faction; that when doing so they consider only their own payoff; and that factionalism can
be inimical to intra-party cooperation. In this respect our model offers a natural benchmark,
namely the policy programme that would prevail if factions were prohibited from forming, de-
fined earlier as P = ({{i} : i ∈ I}, I), under open communication. Thus, we contrast a world
where a politician exerts influence over policy in accord with his own judgement, with one
where he has the opportunity of joining a faction and so increasing the power of its leader. To
make the comparison interesting, we focus on the case in which the faction formation process
does not achieve the first best of a unified party behind a single leader.
5.1. Factionalism under Open Communication in a Canonical Model. We consider
welfare implications of the faction formation process under open communication, within a
broad class of ideology distributions that impose some structure on the primitives of our
model. We assume that there are an odd number of politicians, denote the median politician
by m, and assume that the ideology distribution is symmetric around m and single peaked
at m, in the sense that politicians are more ideologically clustered as they get closer to m.
Formally, we define the ideology distribution b as single peaked and symmetric at m, when
for any i = 1, ...,m− 1, bi+1− bi > 0 weakly decreases in i, and bi+1− bi = bn−i+1− bn−i.20 This
focus is based on the supposition that the ideology distribution is often concentrated closer to
the party median, with fewer politicians found at the ideological extremes of the party.
For this canonical case, we can prove that factionalism is beneficial to the party under open
communication, that it can never be detrimental to attaining party goals, and that factions
should not be prohibited from forming. In doing so we uncover a novel rationale for factions.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the ideology distribution b is single-peaked and symmetric, that
communication is open across factions, and that a single party-wide faction is not a stable
structure. Then, it can never benefit any politician in the party to prohibit factionalism: if the
optimal stable factional structure (C,L) does not coincide with the non-factional party P, then
it strictly improves the welfare of every single politician.
The proof of Proposition 1 is involved and so relegated to the Appendix. The key fact that
leads to the result is that, when the ideology distribution b is single-peaked and symmetric,
the maximal amount of information dj obtained with intra-party communication weakly in-
creases as politician j becomes more moderate. As a consequence it can never be the case
20The definition of symmetric and single-peaked ideology for an even number of politicians is analogous but
slightly more involved. All results hold with even n also.
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(by equation 3) that a moderate politician joins a faction led by a more extreme politician;
as moderate faction leaders are more informed, extreme politicians transfer power to them.
Further, because the ideology distribution b is symmetric, for every transfer of power from a
leftist politician to a more moderate leader there is a corresponding and symmetric transfer
from a right-wing player to a more moderate and informed leader. Each player benefits from
these symmetric transfers, regardless of their ideology. From expression (1), the ideological
loss of each politician i due to j’s decisions is a convex function of the ideological distance be-
tween i and j. So even an extremist gains more from a transfer of power to a moderate leader
on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum, than he loses from a symmetric transfer of
power away from his ideological bliss point.
Our result uncovers a role for party factions. They provide a mechanism for tying extreme
politicians into partitions led by more moderate and informed leaders. Proposition 1 shows
that, within a canonical model specification, their formation always benefits the party. Later,
we develop this insight further, fully characterizing the optimal factional structure for a sub-
case of this environment. Before doing so, and having shown the benefits of faction formation,
we explore conditions under which factions may or may not have negative welfare effects, in a
much simpler model specification. We also ask whether our results change when considering
closed communication.
5.2. Factionalism in a Simple Model with Three Ideological Tendencies. In our in-
troduction, we noted that factions are commonly perceived as detrimental to the achievement
of common party goals. We have shown that this need not be so. Indeed, party objectives can
sometimes be better achieved when factionalism is allowed than when it is prohibited. To
uncover a negative role for factions, we must then move beyond the canonical class of single-
peaked and symmetric ideology distributions for which, as we have seen, factions involve
empowering relatively moderate and better informed faction leaders.
We first note that factions can be detrimental, relative to a benchmark where they are pro-
hibited, only when (i) a party without factions is optimal and (ii) this outcome can only be
achieved by prohibiting them. Put otherwise, it must be that a non factional party is opti-
mal, but that it is not a stable structure when politicians can voluntarily join factions. We
demonstrate that this occurs only when factions form around leaders whose views are ex-
treme relative to those of their members. When factionalism increases the power of these
extreme-ideology politicians it can be detrimental to the party as a whole.
We illustrate these findings in a simple environment, where the party is formed of three
distinct ideological groups: left, center and right. There are nL politicians with ideology
−bL, nC politicians with ideology zero, and nR politicians with ideology bR. Following Rose
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(1964), we refer to these leftist, centrist and right-wing groups as ideological tendencies.
Our distinction between a faction and a tendency closely mimics that of Rose (1964) who
described the former as “self-consciously organized as a body, with a measure of discipline
and cohesion”, whereas the latter is instead “a stable set of attitudes, rather than a stable set
of politicians.”(Empirical evidence for this distinction from the British House of Commons,
using proximity scaling of divisions, is provided by Wood and Jacoby (1984).) We thus study
how a party of underlying tendencies relates to a stable factional structure: as we shall see,
intuitively, stable factions form when the ideological differences between tendencies is not
too large. We explore the welfare consequences of these intra-party partitions. While we do
not impose any restrictions on nL, nC and nR, we have in mind an application to sufficiently
large parties where the number of informed politicians is non-negligible for each tendency.21
There are three possibilities with respect to the stable factional structures. The first is that
the programme is decided in its entirety by the leader of a party-wide faction. When the party
is unified in such a faction with a welfare-maximizing leader, then welfare is higher than in
a non-factional party as the first best is achieved. Another possibility is that the party is not
factionalized. Welfare is of course equivalent whether factions are allowed or prohibited. Of
more interest is the third and remaining possibility: two tendencies are joined in a cohesive
faction, thus leaving the remaining tendency isolated.
In dealing with this case, and without loss of generality, we take the right-wing tendency
to be isolated. Still there are two possibilities. The leader of the faction may be of the left
or the center: we refer to the former as a left-center faction and the latter as a center-left
faction. In exploring welfare implications it is immediate that a center-left faction benefits
the party always: leftist politicians must benefit, as joining a faction led by a centrist leader
is a voluntary choice; centrist politicians benefit a fortiori as faction formation increases the
power of a centrist leader; and right-wing politicians benefit as a center-left faction reduces
influence of the left. This thus reinforces our earlier message that factionalism is beneficial
when extreme politicians are tied into factions led by moderates.
To see why factionalism can be detrimental we consider the case where the welfare maximiz-
ing equilibrium involves a left-center faction. Centrists must benefit as faction formation is
voluntary, as do leftists a fortiori; however, increasing the influence of a leftist leader may be
so detrimental to right-wing politicians as to induce an overall welfare loss for the party.
Proposition 2. Suppose that there are three ideological tendencies: left, center, and right. If
the optimal stable party structure under open communication involves a center-left (or center-
right) faction, then factionalism is beneficial to the party. If the optimal stable party structure
21We note that when the ideological difference between two tendencies is not too large, then a leader of the
resulting faction that forms between them is informed by all members of her faction.
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under open communication is such that a left-center or right-center faction forms, then fac-
tionalism may be detrimental to the party.
In a three-tendency model, our result highlights that a necessary though not sufficient con-
dition for factionalism to be detrimental is that the faction leader is extreme. Investigating
further, we present details of an example for particular parameter values.
Example 1. Consider a stable left-center faction: Let nC = 3, nR = 3 and set nL sufficiently
large so that the faction leader is from the left (in, fact, nL ≥ 5 will suffice). Suppose bL and
bR are sufficiently large that L and R tendency politicians cannot communicate to C tendency
politicians, nor viceversa: specifically, set bL > 1/12, and bR > 1/12. At the same time, take
bL sufficiently small that C tendency politicians are willing to be in the faction led by a leftist
leader: specifically, set bL ≤
√
1
30 − 16nL+12 , noting that the right hand side of this inequality is
larger than 1/12 because nL ≥ 5.
In order to compare welfare in the party with a left-center faction to that of a party in which
factionalism is prohibited, we specialize the example to nL = 6 and bL = 1/10. Straightforward
algebra reveals the following: when bR > 1/4, factionalism is detrimental to the party, whereas
if 1/12 < bR < 1/4, then factionalism is beneficial to the party.
Our example demonstrates that factionalism may be detrimental to the party when the ten-
dency of right-wing politicians is fairly extreme. In this case, they are severely hurt by the
influence of the leftist leader of a left-center faction and this more than cancels the gains of
other politicians from faction formation. Beyond this somewhat pathological circumstance,
factions strictly benefit the party and so should never be prohibited.
The conditions we identified for factions to be detrimental to the party appear stringent.
This suggests the beneficial consequences of allowing politicians to freely join factions and
thereby increase the influence of their leaders. As argued earlier, however, factionalism may
damage parties by exacerbating noncooperative intra-party behaviour. To explore this issue
we analyze a closed world where intra-party dialogue is restricted. Specifically we assume
that communication can occur only within factions.
Our analysis reveals, surprisingly, that whether communication is open or closed is immate-
rial as long as the number of informed politicians in any tendency is not too small (specifically,
it is sufficient to set nL ≥ 3, nC ≥ 3 and nR ≥ 3). This is because there is no ideology con-
figuration b such that a politician j would be willing to communicate truthfully with faction
leader l if allowed to do so, yet be unwilling to be in l’s faction. In fact, both the decision
to communicate truthfully and to join the faction depend on the leader’s information dl and
on the ideology difference |bi − bl|. However, the willingness to be truthful decreases in dl,
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whereas the willingness to be in the faction increases in dl. When nL ≥ 3, nC ≥ 3 and nR ≥ 3,
any leader l has information dl no smaller than 3 (at a minimum, he can gather truthful
messages of the politicians of his same tendency). For dl ≥ 3, politician i cannot be willing to
communicate truthfully to l, without being simultaneously willing to stay in l’s faction.
Proposition 3. When there are three tendencies such that nL ≥ 3, nC ≥ 3, and nR ≥ 3, the
restrictions that factions may impose on intra-party communication are irrelevant to the wel-
fare consequences of factionalism. Factionalism with closed communication within factions
benefits the party unless it is divided into factions with non-centrist leaders.
Somewhat contrary to conventional wisdom, the overall conclusion of our welfare analysis is
that, by and large, factions based on ideology are beneficial to the party. This insight stems
from two aspects of factionalism that we believe have previously been overlooked. Firstly,
factions form via a process of voluntary transfer of power over the party decisions. Secondly,
factions are by definition part of a larger body that has a common objective. Our specific mes-
sage is that factions provide a mechanism for preventing politicians with relatively extreme
views, or relatively poor information, from acting autonomously in the party.
6. CHARACTERIZATION OF OPTIMAL PARTY FACTIONS
We have established that factionalism is beneficial to a party under a broad set of circum-
stances. Correspondingly, we have shown that a negative association between ideological
factions and welfare can be established only under quite restrictive conditions. Moreover
we have uncovered an intriguing rationale for factions in tying extreme and poorly informed
politicians into partitions led by moderate and well informed leaders. Here we develop this
insight further, undertaking the full characterization of optimal party factions within a sim-
ple environment that is a subcase of the canonical model studied earlier.
6.1. Open Communication in a Model with Equidistant Ideological Neighbours. We
study a party with an odd number of politicians, I ≥ 5 where the ideological distance between
each politician and his closest ideological neighbor is fixed and equal to β. So we assume that
bi = iβ for i = 1, ...I. Considering politicians i and j, we let i − j denote the number of
“ideological positions” separating i from j. Further, we assume throughout that K = I: each
politician is initially endowed with authority over a single dimension.
Using this example we derive an iterative construction of the optimal stable factional struc-
ture, based on the following intuitive ideas. In the optimal structure, politicians should join
a faction led by a more moderate politician whenever possible. Politicians are constrained:
as the ideological distance β increases, they will be unable in equilibrium to join factions
23
led by politicians that are too ideologically distant. We show that the optimal structure is
determined by the requirement that the most extreme politicians join factions led by as mod-
erate a politician as possible, thus reinforcing the imperative of tying in the extremists. In
fact we show that this imperative dominates all other requirements. In particular, selecting
the stable faction that ensures that extremists are tied to leaders with intermediate ideology
requires that such leaders do not join factions led by even more moderate politicians, even
though there are stable factions in which they do.
The details of our analysis are somewhat intricate and so we begin our exposition with the
informal description of a simple example.
Example 2. Open Communication in a Party with 7 Politicians. We determine the
optimal stable factional structure that maximizes party welfare for the case of I = 7 politicians
and open communication with equidistant bias bi = iβ for i = 1, ...I.
Dispensing with much detail, we focus on the provision of a clear exposition of our insights.22
Depending on the parameter value β, the optimal stable structure may take different forms.
We distinguish between three mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases defined by the degree
of ideological distance between a politician and his nearest ideological neighbor.
Small Distance. We first suppose that the ideological distance between a politician and his
closest ideological neighbor is small, specifically, β ≤ 145
√
5. We can then show that the party
should be united under the leadership of the median politician m = 4. First, we note that,
in this case, the analysis in section 4 implies that the maximum equilibrium information of
the median player 4, defined as d4, is at least 3. Moreover, we note that, by inequality (2), all
politicians are willing to join a faction led by player 4 when d4 ≥ 3 and β ≤ 145
√
5. Uniting the
party under the most moderate politician yields the optimal structure, as it minimizes the
aggregate ideological loss.
Intermediate Distance. Now suppose that the ideological distance between a politician and




5 < β ≤ 130
√
5. Then we show that in the optimal stable structure, the party is divided
into 3 factions: {1, 2, 3}, {4} and {5, 6, 7} whose leaders are 3 , 4, and 5 respectively.
We begin as before by calculating the maximum equilibrium information dj of any player j.
Doing so, and because 145
√
5 < β ≤ 130
√
5, we obtain that dj = 3. Further, because 145
√
5 < β,
the most extreme politicians 1 and 7 are no longer willing to join a faction led by the median
player 4. However, it is still possible that they join a faction led by a more moderate politician
and in so doing that they improve party welfare. Inequality (2) implies that any politician i
would join a faction led by a more moderate politician j who is at most 2 ideological positions
22The precise analysis is presented in an online appendix.
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away from i: so player 1 is willing to join a faction led by either 2 or 3. If the faction is led by
3 then, since it must be ideologically connected, 2 must join it also. So faction {1, 2, 3} forms.
If 1 decides to act independently, however, then 2 can join a faction led by 4 in which case
faction {2, 3, 4} forms. It can be shown that the former configuration is more advantageous.
Because of the concavity in the politicians’ payoff functions, the party’s (collective) first order
concern is to avoid extreme political stands. This can be achieved by tying the extremists into
factions led by more moderate leaders. Extending this reasoning, it can be shown that the
optimal stable factional structure comprises 2 factions: {1, 2, 3}, and {5, 6, 7}, whose leaders
are 3, and 5 respectively.23 This configuration leaves the most moderate politician 4 isolated.
Now suppose that the ideological distance between a politician and his closest ideological




5 < β ≤ 112
√
2. Following the same steps as in the previous case, we find that politicians
are only willing to stay in factions led by their immediate ideological neighbors. The party
imperative– avoiding extreme ideological stands– requires that politicians 1 and 7 form a
faction led by their respective neighbors 2 and 6, so that the optimal factional structure is
{1, 2} and {6, 7}. As a consequence, the remaining players 3 and 5 then form a faction {3, 4, 5}
led by 4.
Large Distance. Finally, we consider a highly polarized party, specifically β > 112
√
2. Then,
politicians are unwilling to join factions even when they are led by their most immediate
neighbor. Hence, the only possible stable structure is one where each politician acts indepen-
dently, i.e. no factions are formed.
We now derive a general characterization, building on two central points arising from the
example above.
First, we have seen that, in order to improve party welfare, politicians should join factions
led by more moderate politicians. When the ideological distance is not too small, extreme
politicians are unwilling to join a faction led by the median politician, but every politician
is willing to join a faction led by a more moderate politician who is ideologically separated
by, at most, a specific number of ideological positions. Intuitively, the number of ideological
positions is a decreasing function of the ideological distance β. For example, we have seen
that for 130
√
5 < β ≤ 112
√
2, politicians are willing to transfer influence only to immediate ide-
ological neighbors, whereas for 145
√
5 < β ≤ 130
√
5, they are also willing to transfer influence
to politicians that differ by two ideological positions.
23These factional structure are stable because leaders are more informed than more extreme politicians, and do
not have an incentive to transfer influence to them. There exist suboptimal stable factional structures, in which
moderate politicians transfer influence to more extremist leaders.
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Second, we have seen that the optimal organization of the party when β is intermediate in-
volves factions that include extreme politicians and the most moderate politicians possible.
This holds regardless of the reduced capability of more moderate politicians to transfer influ-
ence. In our seven player example, we have seen that if 1 is willing to be in a faction led by
2 but not by 3, then the faction {1, 2} is part of the optimal factional structure even though 2
would willing to be in a faction led by 3. Making (already) moderate politicians adopt (more)
moderate stances is less important for party welfare than tying extreme politicians to more
moderate leaders.
Our findings suggest an iterative procedure to calculate the welfare-maximizing factional
structure (C,L). Initially, as a function of the ideological difference β, we calculate the max-
imum number q of ideological positions across which a politician is willing to transfer influ-
ence. Then, we build the optimal party organization. We make extreme politicians 1 and
I be led by politicians that are q ideological positions more moderate, (i.e. q + 1 and I − q
respectively). Since factions must be ideologically connected, this implies that all politicians
between 1 and q (respectively, between I − q and I) also join the faction led by q + 1 (respec-
tively, I − q). If the remaining politicians q + 2, ..., I − q − 1 are now willing to be led by
the median m = (I + 1)/2, then they should be united in a single faction under her. Other-
wise, the iterative procedure continues by building two factions {q + 2, q + 3, ..., 2q + 1} and
{I − 2q, I − 2q + 1, ..., I − q − 1} , and then considering the remaining politicians 2q+ 2, ..., I −
2q − 1. This procedure continues until the remaining politicians are united under a faction
led by the median.
Proposition 4 below confirms that the conjectured iterative procedure delivers the optimal
factional structure, determines q precisely as a function of β, and in so doing calculates the
equilibrium information dl of all faction leaders l. Moreover, it derives the number G of
factions in the optimal stable structure and their size. In the statement below, for any real
number x, the notation bxc denotes the largest integer smaller than x, whereas the notation
dxe denotes the smallest integer larger than x.
Proposition 4. Suppose that there are an odd number I ≥ 5 of politicians, and that ideo-
logical neighbors are at fixed ideological distance β. The optimal stable factional structure is
characterized as follows: (i) The leader of each faction is always its most moderate politician;
(ii) Letting g (d) = (2 · d(d− 1)/2e · (d+ 2))−1 for any integer d, and letting d∗ be the integer d
such that g(d+1) < β ≤ g(d), each leader l’s equilibrium information equals d (β) = min{I, d∗},













+ 1 factions, symmetrically
arranged around the median politician m = (I + 1)/2; all factions are of size q (β) + 1, but the
one containing the median politician m, which is of size M = I − (G− 1)(q(β) + 1).
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A consequence of our result is that, in the optimal stable party faction, the median politician
m = (I + 1)/2 never joins the faction of a different leader: he is the most moderate politician,
hence his decisions minimize the aggregate ideological loss of the party. Further, he is never
less informed than any other politician. Combining these two considerations delivers the
implication that it is never beneficial for him to join the faction of another.
Before concluding our analysis of the optimal partition of parties into factions with open
communication, we highlight one further substantive implication of our findings. We note
that an external observer cannot always infer party policy from a simple summary statistic
such as the median preference. Indeed, and as a consequence of our rationale for factionalism,
we observe that when the ideological distance between ideological neighboring politicians
is neither too large nor too small, then the optimal party structure comprises the factions
{1, 2, 3}, {4} and {5, 6, 7} for β ≤ 130
√
5, whereas for β > 130
√
5, it comprises the factions {1, 2},
{3, 4, 5} and {6, 7} . Hence, the programme will differ according to β, although the ideology
of the median politician 4 remains unchanged (when renormalizing the ideologies, setting
bi = (i− 4)β, for i = 1, ..., 7). Whilst intuitively one might think that knowledge of the party
median provides a strong indicator of the policies a party will pursue, our analysis suggests
that this is the case only for small ideological differences within the party. Otherwise a
detailed analysis of the stable party factions is required. So we conclude that factions matter
for collective choice.
6.2. Closed Communication with Equidistant Ideological Neighbors. We conclude
this section by addressing the case of closed communication. To do so, we revisit Example 2,
with 7 politicians and equidistant ideological neighbors.
Example 3. A Party with 7 Politicians and Closed Communication. We study the opti-
mal stable factional structure for the case of I = 7 politicians with equidistant bias bi = iβ for
i = 1, ...I, who can communicate only with members of their faction.
Small Distance. When β ≤ 145
√
5, as in the case of open communication, the party should
be united under the leadership of the median politician m = 4. Indeed, the constraint that
communication occurs only among the same faction members does not play any role if the
party is united.
Intermediate Distance. In the range 145
√
5 < β ≤ 130
√
5, there are two optimal configura-
tions: the one with factions {1, 2, 3, 4} and {5, 6, 7} , and the one with factions {1, 2, 3} and
{4, 5, 6, 7} . In both configurations, the faction leaders are 3 and 5 respectively. To appreciate
the difference with the case of open communication, recall that there the optimal configura-
tion is C = {{1, 2, 3} , {4} , {5, 6, 7}} , with leaders 3, 4, and 5. The reason why (C,L) does not
maximize welfare with closed communication is because it requires the median politician,
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player 4, to be isolated. But being isolated, player 4 can count only on his own information,
and this makes his decision very imprecise. As a result, 4 is now willing to transfer authority
to player 3 or 5, and this improves party welfare.
In the range 130
√
5 < β ≤ 112
√
2, the optimal configuration is composed of three factions {1, 2} ,
{3, 4, 5} and {6, 7} , with leaders 2, 4 and 6 respectively, as in the case of open communication.
Large Distance. When β > 112
√
2, then as with open communication, the only possibility is
that no factions form. Communication between politicians could not take place even with
open communication. A fortiori, it cannot occur when communication is constrained to hap-
pen only within factions. As a result, all politicians prefer to act independently.24
The significance of contrasting our 7 player examples under closed and open communication
is in highlighting that the provisions of the party programme need not be uniquely identified
by the ideological distribution of politicians. Here, we show that the social norms that deter-
mine how communication takes place within a party play a role in determining the optimal
stable factions, and hence the details of the final party programme.
The prohibition of communication may reduce the number of factions in the optimal struc-
ture. Ostensibly, the party will be less divided. Closed communication makes division more
costly and hence, in the optimal stable structure, the party needs to be more unified.
While this might suggests that closed communication may benefit the party, this is not so.
This is because, in contrast to open communication, power may be transferred to relatively
extreme leaders. (Unlike in example 2, here it is optimal that politician 4 joins the faction
led by either politician 3 or 5 as otherwise he would be uninformed). Moreover, such lead-
ers are (weakly) less informed than a leader would be in the case of open communication.
Closed communication is thus always (weakly) detrimental to the party, and to each single
individual politician, relative to open communication. The intuition then is simple: closed
communication implies that power may be transferred to relatively extreme faction leaders
who are weakly less informed. Closed communication is detrimental as it constrains the
amount of information conveyed to faction leaders in equilibrium, though, by expression (1),
each politician is better off if leaders are as informed as possible.
24The ranges for the different optimal party configurations are the same as under open communication because,
at the relevant thresholds, the number of politicians in each optimal faction under closed communication is at
least as large as dl, the maximum amount of information of each leader l in the communication game. So, the
constraint of closed communication does not bind. For example, at the boundary β = 1
45
√
5, the party is united
and hence the closed communication constraint is irrelevant, and at the boundary β = 1
30
√
5, the optimal factions
are composed of at least 3 politicians, and the maximum amount of information dl is also 3.
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7. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Although factions are ubiquitous, they are commonly perceived as playing a negative role in
political life. Nevertheless, several empirical studies have suggested that factions can play a
role in integrating extreme ideological streams of a party. We provide a formal defence of fac-
tions consistent with this more positive view. Our key research findings can be summarized
succinctly: factions play a role in tying extreme party politicians to more moderate faction
leaders, who are better informed and so better placed to make decisions on behalf of a party.
This leads to a defence of factions: they enhance the quality of party programmes, by keeping
the actions of the most extreme and less informed politicians in check, under guidance of
more informed and moderate ones.
We conclude, then, by highlighting possible extensions, applications, and central lessons of
our analysis.
How might our insights extend to a world with political competition? We were motivated in
part by recent research (Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013)) showing that intra-party deliber-
ation enhances the quality of programmatic platforms and so provides electoral benefits. Our
results reveal that factions can facilitate information sharing via intra-party deliberation and
suggests that they may also provide electoral benefits.25 So a reasonable conjecture, albeit
one left to further research, is that our central insights extend to a competitive environment.
A limiting factor with respect to the generality of our conclusions is that we assume a party
whose politicians share a common objective. We can be agnostic as to what the common ob-
jective is–the central point is that whatever politicians’ objectives, and insofar as the party
programme can be used to attain them, party politicians are uncertain as to which policies
best serve their intentions. We do assume, however, that party politicians are alike with
respect to the weight they place on the common objectives and their idiosyncratic (ideologi-
cal) concerns. Nevertheless, we can confirm that in at least one obvious and realistic case,
where politicians with the most extreme ideological preferences care less about the common
objective, all of our results hold.
While there are limitations, it is also likely that our insights travel beyond political parties.
Many organizations have a common objective to reach informed decisions, consist of a diverse
body of opinion, and maintain organized internal groups who seek to control decision making.
Consider, as one example, the case of an academic department that has a number of faculty
positions to be filled, would like the hires that are made to be of a quality that enhances the
reputation of the department, and where information about candidates is dispersed amongst
25Muller-Rommel (1982) extends his argument about the integrating role of factions in the German SPD, cited
earlier, by stating (page 267) that “intraparty factionalism neither had a negative effect on electoral results, nor
was serious consideration given to a the party splitting.”
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faculty members who also have idiosyncratic biases. Our insights extend to such an environ-
ment: starting from a point where all or some have a say in the hiring process, it would be
beneficial for groups to form behind distinct leaders of factions who make final decisions.
Our defence of factions provides lessons to be learned: restrictions on information sharing
between factions can be detrimental. This suggests that an optimal party design involves
factions that tie extreme members to moderate leaders, so facilitating better information-
sharing, alongside institutions that enable inter-factional dialogue.
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dL(F ) (C,L) + 2
) + (bi − bL(F ))2 ≤ 16(1 + 2) . (5)
Player i does not communicate with player j when |bi − bj | > 12(dj+2) . Therefore player i does
not communicate with his faction leader L(F ) when the latter condition holds together with
condition (5) for j = L(F ). Rearranging these conditions, we obtain the inequality chain










3− 1), or that dL(F ) (C,L) > 3√3−1 − 2, so that dL(F ) (C,L) ≥ 3.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that the ideology distribution is symmetric and single-
peaked and that the non-factional party P = ({{i} : i ∈ I}, I) is not the optimal stable fac-
tional structure, or else the comparison is trivial. If the non-factional party is a stable fac-
tional structure, we have the result immediately. So, suppose that P is not a stable factional
structure. By construction, in P all politicians i are as informed as possible: di (P) is the inte-




= d. So, for P not to be a stable factional structure,
there must be some politician i prefers to be in a faction led by a different politician j, rather
than acting autonomously, i.e.,
1
6 (di (P) + 2) >
1
6 (dj (P) + 2) + (bi − bj)
2 . (6)
Hence, it must be the case that dj (P) > di (P) . Next, observe that for any j = 1, ..m, dj (P)
weakly increases in j, because the ideology distribution b is single-peaked and symmetric
(and symmetrically, it weakly decreases in j, for j = m, ..., I). In fact, note that because for
any j = 1, ..m− 1, bj+1− bj weakly decreases in j, it follows that nj(b) = |{i ∈ I : |bi − bj | ≤ b}|




= d weakly in-
creases in j. Hence, for any politician i and j satisfying inequality (6), it must be that j is
closer to m than i: all politicians not acting independently in the party must join factions led
by more moderate politicians. By symmetry of the ideology distribution b, for any i willing to
be in a faction led by j, it must also be the case that n− i + 1 is willing to be in a faction led
by n− j+ 1; and it must also be that case that dj (P) = dn−j+1 (P) and di (P) = dn−i+1 (P) . By
inspection of expression (1), we see that the utility of every single politician i′ is improved by
these politicians joining factions led by more moderate leaders. This is because, first, leaders
j and n− j + 1 are more informed than politicians i and n− i+ 1. Second, even when player
i′ suffers an ideological loss by i joining the faction led by j (which happens if i′ < i < j or
if j < i < i′), because of the convexity of the ideological loss (bi′ − bj′)2, player i′ ideologically
gains more from politician n − i + 1 joining the faction led by n − j + 1, than he loses from i
joining the faction led by j.
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Consider now the factional structure (C,L) iteratively constructed as follow. Let F0 be the
largest set of ideologically-adjacent politicians i such that Ui (m,P) ≥ Ui (i,P) , i.e., that they
weakly prefer to join a faction led by m rather than acting autonomously in the party. Note
that F0 is non-empty as it contains m. Let l−1 be the largest index i smaller than m such
that i does not belong to F0; and l1 be the smallest index i larger than m such that i does not
belong to F0. Let F−1 be the largest set of ideologically-adjacent politicians i not in F0 such
that Ui (l−1,P) ≥ Ui (i,P) ; and analogously define F1. For any k ≥ 2, let l−k be the largest
index i smaller than m such that i does not belong to Fk−1 and F−k be the largest set of
ideologically-adjacent politicians i not in Fk such that Ui (l−k,P) ≥ Ui (i,P) ; defining lk and
Fk analogously. Iterate the procedure until a partitional structure (C,L) is obtained.
Now, we prove that the obtained factional structure (C,L) is stable and provides welfare
larger than P so concluding the proof. To see that (C,L) is a stable factional structure,
we first note that for any l ∈ L, Ui (l, C,L) = Ui (l,P) Further, for any F ∈ C and any
i ∈ F , Ui (l(F ), C,L) = Ui (l(F ),P) ≥ Ui (i,P) ≥ Ui (i, C,L) ; by construction of (C,L) and
because di (C,L) ≤ di (P) by definition. As far as the comparison between Ui (l(F ), C,L) and
Ui (l(F
′), C,L) for any F ′ 6= F is concerned, we proceed as follows. If the leader l(F ′) is further
away from m than l(F ), then it immediately follows from the previous step that Ui (i,P) ≥
Ui (l(F
′),P) = Ui (l(F ′), C,L) . Because by construction Ui (l(F ), C,L) = Ui (l(F ),P) > Ui (i,P),
it must be that Ui (l(F ), C,L) > Ui (l(F ′), C,L) . Finally, suppose that l(F ′) is closer to m than
l(F ). By construction, Ul(F ) (l(F ), C,L) = Ul(F ) (l(F ),P) > Ul(F ) (l(F ′),P) = Ul(F ) (l(F ′), C,L) .
Hence, because l(F ) is between i and l(F ′), it follows that Ui (l(F ), C,L) > Ui (l(F ′), C,L) , by
convexity of the ideological loss (bi − bl)2 in expression (1). To conclude that (C,L) gives a
strictly larger welfare than P, we note that (i) (C,L) cannot coincide with P, or else P would
be a stable factional structure; and (ii) (C,L) requires that some players i join factions led by
more moderate and more informed leaders, which benefits all players, as shown earlier.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first consider the case in which the leader is a centrist in the
center-left faction. Let WL, WC , WR and W¯L, W¯C ,W¯R be the aggregate welfare of politicians
of tendency L, C and R under factionalization and non-factionalization respectively. Politi-
cians of tendencyR and C strictly benefit from politicians of tendency L joining the faction led
by the centrist leader, so that WC > W¯C and WR > W¯R. If it were the case, by contradiction,
that WL+ WC +WR < W¯L + W¯C + W¯R, then it would be the case that W¯L > WL. Thus, non-
factionalization would be a stable factional structure, and, indeed, the welfare maximizing
one; but this would contradict the premise.
Suppose that the leader of the left-center faction is the leftist politician. We show with a
parameterized example that factionalization may or may not be detrimental to the party.
Let nC = 3, nR = 3 and set nL sufficiently large so that a leftist leader is able to attract C
tendency politicians (in, fact, nL ≥ 5 will suffice). We construct the example so that bL and bR
are sufficiently large that L and R tendency politicians cannot communicate to C tendency
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politicians, nor viceversa: Specifically, bL > 12(nC+1+2) =
1
2(3+1+2) = 1/12, and bR > 1/12.
At the same time, we want bL sufficiently small that C tendency politicians are willing to
join the faction led by the leftist leader: Specifically, 16(nC+2) =
1




30 − 16nL+12 , and the latter is larger than 1/12 because nL ≥ 5. We now compare




6 (nL + 2)
+
nC





6 (nR + 2)











6 (nC + 2)
+
nR








6 (nL + 2)
+ nL(bL + bR)
2 +
nC





6 (nR + 2)
)




6 (nL + 2)
+
nR
6 (nR + 2)






6 (nL + 2)












6 (nL + 2)
+ (nL + nC)(bL + bR)
2 +
nR
6 (nR + 2)
)
Specializing the example to nL = 6 and bL = 1/10 for brevity, the difference between the first
and the second expression is 95bR− 920 . Hence, whenever bR > 1/4, factionalism is detrimental
to the party, whereas if 1/12 < bR < 1/4, then it is beneficial.
Proof of Proposition 3. By our previous analysis, a politician i is willing to communicate
truthfully to a politician j in equilibrium only if |bi − bj | ≤ [2(dj (C,L) + 2)]−1 , whereas he
is willing to join the faction led by j instead of acting autonomously if [6 (di (C,L) + 2)]−1 ≥
[6 (dj (C,L) + 2)]−1 + (bi − bj)2 . Because di (C,L) = 1, rearranging the second inequality and
simplifying, we obtain: |bi−bj | ≤
√
[6 (1 + 2)]−1 − [6 (dj (C,L) + 2)]−1. The function (2(d+ 2))−1
decreases in d, whereas the function
√
(6 (1 + 2))−1 − (6 (d+ 2))−1 increases in d, and they
cross at d = 2.0981. Hence, for dj (C,L) ≥ nj = 3,
√
(6 (1 + 2))−1 − (6 (dj (C,L) + 2))−1 >
[2(dj (C,L) + 2)]−1 , so if a politician i is willing to communicate truthfully to a politician j,
then he is also willing to join a faction led by j.
Proof of Proposition 4. We begin by establishing a few intermediate results. The first
explores the structure of any player j’s maximal information dj .
Lemma A.2. The median politician m’s maximal equilibrium information equals dm =
min{I, d∗} whenever g(d∗ + 1) < β ≤ g(d∗), where g(d) = (2 · d(d− 1)/2e · (d+ 2))−1 for all inte-
ger d. Further, letting δ = b(dm − 1)/2c , player j’s maximal equilibrium information dj = dm
whenever j = δ + 1, ..., n− δ; for all other politicians j, it is the case that dj ≤ dm.
Proof. We know that i communicates with m if and only if |bi − bm| ≤ (2 (dm + 2))−1 .
Because the median politician m has exactly b(dm − 1)/2c politicians willing to communi-
cate on one side and d(dm − 1)/2e on the other, it follows that the condition simplifies to:
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β ≤ (2 · d(dm − 1)/2e · (dm + 2))−1, for the player who is ideologically most distant from m.
The first result then immediately follows. To prove the second result, note that a left-wing
politician that has at least b(dm − 1)/2c politicians to his left can elicit as much information
as the median politician. Due to the equidistant bias structure, no politician can elicit more.
The second Lemma explicitly calculates the maximal number of ideological positions q be-
tween a politician and his faction leader with maximal information d.
Lemma A.3. Politician i prefers to join a faction led by q′+i if such politician has information
d, instead of acting autonomously if and only if














and rearranging the expression in that earlier result.
We proceed with the proof of Proposition 4 by showing that every politician i is willing to join
the faction led by one of the maximally informed politicians j = δ + 1, ..., n − δ. Evidently,
the worst case scenario is given by the most extreme politicians 1, and I. Simplifying the
condition that guarantees the politician 1 is willing to join a faction let by δ + 1, we obtain:
δβ = b(dm − 1)/2cβ ≤
√
dm(β)− 1
18 (dm(β) + 2)
.
Because dm is a step function strictly decreasing in β, it is sufficient to check the condition at
the sequence {βd}d=1 of the maximal β associated to each dm. Since βd = (2 · d(d− 1)/2e · (d+ 2))−1 ,
the condition then becomes
b(dm − 1)/2c
2 d(dm − 1)/2e (dm + 2) ≤
√
dm − 1
18 (dm + 2)
,
which always holds. In concluding that each politician i improves welfare by joining a faction
led by a more moderate politician, with information dm, and no more than q ideological posi-
tions away from i, we restrict the set of possible optimal stable factional structures. In the
optimal one, each faction has cardinality no larger than q + 1, its leader is the most moder-
ate politician, and all faction leaders have the same information, dm. Continuing, note that
the problem is symmetric around m. Hence, finding the optimal stable factional structure is
equivalent to finding the optimal partition of the set {1, 2, ...,m}, among the partitions with
elements of cardinality no larger than q + 1.
Next, observe that the party gain when politicians join factions led by moderates diminishes
with the moderation of the politician joining the faction. Formally suppose that politician j
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(bi − bM )2 + (bM − bj)2
]
I
= − (bM − bj+k)2 + (bM − bj)2 = (M − j)2 β2 − (M − j − k)2 β2
which is decreasing in j, because ∂∂j
(
(M − j)2 β2 − (M − j − k)2 β2
)
= −2β2k < 0.
To complete the proof, suppose that we start from the non-factionalized party P, restrict
attention to {1, 2, ...,m}, the half-left set of politicians, and we construct the optimal stable
structure by making politicians join factions one by one. If any of the politicians k = 1, 2, ..q
joins the faction led by q + 1, there is a larger welfare gain than if any politician j + k joins a
faction led by q+ j + 1. Hence, the first element of the optimal stable partition on {1, 2, ...,m}
must be {1, 2, ..., q + 1} . Iterating the argument, we obtain that the optimal stable partition
on {1, 2, ...,m} corresponds to the factional structure reported in the hypothesis.
1ANALYTICAL DERIVATIONS NOT SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION
Formal analysis of example 1. As shown in the main text, depending on the parameter
value β, the optimal stable structure may take different forms. The exposition below fills in
the details.
We first show that, when β ≤ 145
√
5, the party is united under the leadership of the median
politician m = 4.
First, note that the maximum equilibrium information d4 of player 4 is at least 3 for β ≤ 1/10.
In fact, for d4 to be equal to 3, it must be that one neighbor on each side of 4 is willing to




5 < 1/10, it follows that when β ≤ 145
√
5, the median politician’s maximum equilibrium
information d4 is at least 3.
Second, note that for the party to be united under 4, and because of inequality 2, it must be
that:
1
6 (di (C,L) + 2) ≥
1
6 (d4 (C,L) + 2) + (bi − b4)
2 ,
with di (C,L) = 1 for all i 6= 4, and d4 (C,L) ≥ 3. Evidently, the worse case scenario is found
when considering the most extreme politicians i = 1, 7 and d4 (C,L) = 3. When setting i = 1
or i = 7, we have that bi − b4 = 3β, so that simplifying the above expression we obtain the





5 < β ≤ 130
√
5, we show that the party is divided in 3 factions: {1, 2, 3}, {4} , and
{5, 6, 7} , whose leaders are respectively 3, 4 and 5.
Because 130
√
5 < 1/10, again, it is the case that the maximum equilibrium information d4 of
player 4 is at least 3. But now, it cannot be larger than 3 either. In fact, this would require that
at least 2 politicians on one side of 4 are truthful to him in equilibrium. This would require
that 2β ≤ [2(d4 + 2)]−1 , where d4 would be at least 4. In sum, if the maximum equilibrium
information d4 of player 4 were larger than 3, it would be necessary that β ≤ [2 · 2(4 + 2)]−1 =
1/24. But because 1/24 < 145
√
5, this possibility is ruled out by β > 145
√
5.
Having concluded that the maximum equilibrium information d4 of player 4 is exactly 3 it is
immediate that this is also true for any other player j = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Each one of these players,
in fact, has at least two neighbors on the same side and one on the opposite side.
Because β > 145
√
5, uniting the party under politician 4 is not an option anymore. It is possi-
ble, however, that any politician i joins a faction led by another politician j = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 who is
at most 2 ideological steps away from i. This is because [6 (di (C,L) + 2)]−1 ≥ [6 (dj (C,L) + 2)]−1+
(2β)2 , when di (C,L) = 1 and dj (C,L) = 3, by using inequality 2.
Now note that party welfare maximization requires that politicians join factions led by more
moderate politicians. This observation rules out many factional structures as optimal, though
2allows several possibilities including, for example, C1 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4} , {5, 6, 7}} with leaders
L1 = {3, 4, 5} , or C2 = {{1, 2} , {3, 4, 5}, {6, 7}} with leaders L2 = {2, 4, 6} .
To see that (C1,L1) provides a higher party welfare than (C2,L2), we need only compare the
ideological losses, because the equilibrium information of all leaders equals 3 in both fac-
tional configurations. Under (C1,L1) , politicians 3 and 5 lead factions of 3 politicians each.
Under (C2,L2) , politicians 2 and 6 lead factions of 2 politicians each, and 4 leads a faction of 3
politicians. Hence the net difference between (C1,L1) and (C2,L2) is that the influence weight
2/7 is taken from the intermediate ideology politicians 3 and 5 each, half of it (1/7) is given to
median player 4 and half to a more extremist politician, respectively 2 and 6. Because play-
ers’ utilities are quadratic losses, they are concave functions, and thus spreading influence





(iβ − 3β)2 +
7∑
i=1
(iβ − 4β)2 + 3
7∑
i=1
(iβ − 5β)2 = 238β2,




(iβ − 2β)2 + 3
7∑
i=1
(iβ − 4β)2 + 2
7∑
i=1
(iβ − 6β)2 = 308β2.
The same argument based on the concavity of the player’s utilities can be repeated for all pos-
sible stable factional structures, to establish that the structures C1 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4} , {5, 6, 7}}
with leaders 3, 4, and 5 are optimal.
For 130
√
5 < β ≤ 112
√
2, we now show that the optimal factional structure comprises the three
factions {1, 2} , {3, 4, 5} , and {6, 7} , with leaders 2, 4 and 6 respectively.
In fact, because β > 130
√
5, players are not willing to join factions led by politicians who are
2 ideological steps away. But because β ≤ 112
√
2, we now establish that they are willing to
join factions led by immediate ideological neighbors. In fact, as seen before, for β ≤ 1/10, the
maximum equilibrium information is dj = 3. In this case, the condition required by inequality
2 for politicians to join the faction led by an immediate neighbor simplifies to β ≤ 115
√
5 which
is larger than 1/10 and hence does not impose any restriction. For 1/10 < β ≤ 1/8, the
possible leaders have information dj = 2. Hence, the condition required by inequality 2 for
politicians to join a faction led by an immediate neighbor simplifies to β ≤ 112
√
2, which is
smaller than 1/8, and hence is the binding condition.
As in the previous case, although (as established) the optimal stable structure requires politi-
cians to join factions led by their moderate neighbors, there are several possible structures.
These include C2 = {{1, 2} , {3, 4, 5}, {6, 7}} with leaders L2 = {2, 4, 6} . In order to conclude
that, indeed, this is the optimal stable structures, we proceed as in case 3, using arguments
based on the concavity of the player’s utilities.
3Finally, for β > 112
√
2, the only possibility is that the party is non-factionalized. In fact, in this
parameter range, the maximum equilibrium information of any possible leader j is dj = 2.
At the same time, politicians are not willing to join factions led by even immediate neighbors
with such equilibrium information.
